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COMMENTS
Bad Faith Breach of Contract: Should This Infant Tort Be Allowed to Grow
in North Carolina?
I. INTRODUCTION
Direct action taken against insurance companies for breaches of their
obligations to their insureds has given birth to a new tort: bad faith
breach of contract.' The tort is committed when an insurer refuses to
meet an implied contractual obligation to deal with its insured fairly and
in good faith.2 Recognition of bad faith breach of contract as an in-
dependent tort may be the most significant development in tort law in
this century.3 The number of claims based on this infant tort likely will
rival the medical malpractice and products liability explosion of recent
years.4
Implied as a matter of law in every contract is a covenant of good faith
and fair dealing.5 The covenant requires that neither party shall by any
act impair the right of the other to receive any benefits flowing from the
agreement. A breach of the convenant occurs when a promisor acts in
bad faith, impairing or destroying a promisee's expected benefit in the
contract.6 According to tort theory, the implied convenant and its bad
faith breach have extra-contractual relevancy which enables the injured
party to seek a remedy in tort.7 For example, an insurer's bad faith re-
fusal to pay an insured's valid claim would result in a breach of the in-
surer's implied-in-law duty to act in good faith and to deal fairly. The
insurer would then become liable in tort for all damages proximately
caused by the breach.' Moreover, punitive damages may be awarded
1. See, e.g., Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480
(1973).
2. See, e.g., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
3. Minor, Proving Bad Faith of an Insurer, TRIAL, Aug.1980, at 17.
4. Knepper, Review of Recent Tort Trends, 29 DEF. L.J. 1, 2 (1980).
5. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.26, at 187, § 7.17, at 526-27 (1982).
6. 3 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 541, at 97 (1960); E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5;
5 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 670, at 159 (3d ed. 1961 & Supp.
1985).
7. W. PROSSER, R. KEETON, D. DOBBS & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 83, at 597-99, § 92 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER & KEETON].
8. Bess & Doherty, Survey of Bad Faith Claims in First Party and Industrial Proceedings, 49
INS. COUNS. J. 368, 369 (1982).
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where the insurer acts fraudulently, maliciously, or in flagrant disregard
of its insured's rights. 9
California pioneered the concept of the tort of bad faith, ° and many
states have followed the lead. " A few states recognize the tort but only if
the action is created by statute. 12 Other states refuse to recognize the
action, finding that adequate remedies already exist in traditional con-
tract theory. 13 North Carolina is one of another group that has yet to
expressly decide whether the new tort will be recognized.14
Part II of this Comment surveys the historical development of the tort
of bad faith breach of contract. Part III identifies the new tort's elements
and analyzes its theoretical basis. Part IV examines public policy consid-
erations accompanying adoption of the tort. These include economic fac-
tors, impact on the courts, and the extent to which the new tort may
reach beyond the insurance arena. Part V discusses the current status
and future of this infant tort in North Carolina. This Comment con-
cludes that the tort of bad faith breach of contract is evolving in response
to a common need for the redress of outrageous bad faith breach of con-
tract and that its acceptance should be encouraged.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE TORT OF BAD FAITH
BREACH OF CONTRACT
The historical development of the law of torts reflects a struggle for
recognition within the common law.1" While formal acceptance of the
9. See, e.g., Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal. Rptr.
711 (1974).
10. Begam, The Law of Outrage, TRIAL, Aug. 1980, at 34, 36.
11. See, e.g., Morgan v. American Family Life Ins. Co., 559 F. Supp. 477 (W.D. Va. 1983);
Chavers v. National Sec. Fire & Casualty Co., 405 So. 2d I (Ala. 1981); Noble v. National Am. Ins.
Co., 128 Ariz. 188, 624 P.2d 866 (1981); Bender v. Time Ins. Co., 286 N.W.2d 489 (N.D. 1980);
Hoskins v. Aetna Ins. Co., 6 Ohio St. 3d 270, 452 N.E.2d 1315 (1983).
12. See, e.g., Tate v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 149 Ga. App. 123, 253 S.E.2d 775 (1979); First
Sec. Bank v. Goddard, 593 P.2d 1040 (Mont. 1979); Salois v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 90 Wash.
2d 355, 581 P.2d 1349 (1978); Jenkins v. J.C. Penney Casualty Ins. Co., 280 S.E.2d 252 (W. Va.
1981).
13. See, e.g., Spencer v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 227 Kan. 914, 611 P.2d 149 (1980); Lawton
v. Great Southwestern Fire Ins. Co., 118 N.H. 607, 392 A.2d 576 (1978); Santelli v. State Farm Ins.
Co., 278 Or. 53, 562 P.2d 965 (1977).
14. See, e.g., Escambia Treating Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 421 F. Supp. 1367 (N.D.
Fla. 1976); Findley v. Time Ins. Co., 264 Ark. 647, 573 S.W.2d 908 (1978); Stanback v. Stanback,
297 N.C. 105, 254 S.E.2d 611 (1979); Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 229 S.E.2d
297 (1976); Dailey v. Integon Ins. Co., 57 N.C. App. 246, 291 S.E.2d 331 (1982).
15. One author on the subject has observed:
Although I can offer only a brief sketch of a large subject, I hope that it will be sufficient to
remind you that the law of Torts is based on the principle that one who harms another has a
duty of compensation whenever it is just that he should pay; that the question of justice involves
not only justice to the persons involved but also to the state; that although justice may be
colored by expediency, it always involves current ideas of economics and morality; that the
specific rules are but crystallizations resulting from the meeting of competing principles in a
given economic and social situation. Further, I hope to persuade you that because of the broad
2
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law of torts as a unified body of legal principles came comparatively late
in legal history, 6 its essential doctrines can be traced to early Anglo-
Saxon tribal law pre-dating the Norman conquest of England. 7 The
Norman skill of efficiency and organization led to a system of courts
which administered justice to its Anglo-Saxon subjects. In order to in-
sure peace in the kingdom, the courts necessarily sought to incorporate
much of the old Anglo-Saxon tribal law to appease the conquered popu-
lace with a system of justice they could recognize and accept.I 8 Thus, the
threads of common law were spun into the fabric of society and the law
of torts became a fixed pattern within the weave of that fabric.
Our historical examination begins' 9 at a time when most lawyers were
adroitly trying to turn every breach of contract into a tort,2" thereby
forcing the English courts to find some line of demarcation. The task of
line drawing illustrates both the homogeneous relationship between tort
and contract and their eventual separation through the centrifuge of
modern legal reasoning. The tort itself-bad faith breach of contract-
suggests the doctrinal overlap of the two areas of law. The distinctions
are often vague and undefined. One judge referred to the tort as "a hy-
brid product, a cross breed of tort and contract, with no pride of ances-
try, and no hope of progeny. After much examination, we are yet unable
base of the law of Torts, unrecognized through centuries but now becoming clear, the courts
have succeeded in creating a workable system, with capacity for change and growth; that be-
cause of this our judges should be free, as they have been in the past, to correct mistakes where
rules have proved to be unjust or unworkable and to create new rights as new interests appear.
3 W. SEAVEY, COGITATIONS ON TORTS § 1, at 3 (1954).
Put succinctly, "tort law is overwhelmingly common law developed in case-by-case decisionmak-
ing by the courts." PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, at 19.
16. The first American treatise in torts was published in 1859 by Francis Hilliard. 1 F. HIL-
LIARD, THE LAW OF TORTS (1859). A major work in torts was published the following year in
England. C. ADDISON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS, OR WRONGS AND THEIR REMEDIES
(1860). Torts was first taught as a separate law school subject in 1870. See THE CENTENIAL HIS-
TORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 29 (1948). The first casebook on torts was introduced in
1874. J. AMES, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS (1874). For an interesting exami-
nation of the development of tort law in the United States, see generally G. WHITE, TORT LAW IN
AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY (1980).
17. See generally F. POLLOCK, THE EXPANSION OF THE COMMON LAW 139-58 app. (1904); see
also 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 12-34, 50-54, 82-87 (4th ed. 1936).
18. Seavey explains that:
when the conquering Normans took control their first effort necessarily was to pacify their
Saxon subjects and to make a unit out of what had been a group of tribes. Their genius for
organization led to the setting up of a system of King's Courts which were truly national, and a
creation of a unified law of the land, for the violation of which the King's Courts would give
redress. These courts did not by any means supercede the former local courts and the rules
adopted were necessarily based largely upon the pre-existing Saxon customs.
3 W. SEAVEY, supra note 15, at 8. See also 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 17, at 145-74.
19. Suffice it to say that the origins of the tort of bad faith breach of contract may well be traced
far into the history of the common law, in both tort and contract, in trespass-on-the-case and as-
sumpsit. However, such an undertaking is beyond the scope of this Comment.
20. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, at 655-62.
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to determine its proper category. '21  The concept boils down to a
residual product of the ambivalence between tort and contract principles,
having its origin in the landmark case of Hadley v. Baxendale.2 2
A. Limitation of Contract Damages
Prior to 1854, almost no rules regarding contract damages existed.
The assessment and award of damages were primarily left to the unbri-
dled discretion of the jury.2 3 Meanwhile, England was well into its in-
dustrial revolution, a period in time where commercial activity reached
new levels of complexity and the needs of businessmen engaging in such
activity changed.2 4 Excessive jury awards, which levied liability based on
unforeseeable losses, were seen to impose upon a businessman or business
a burden greatly disproportionate to the initial risk and to the corre-
sponding contractual benefit.25 This was the atmosphere in which Had-
ley v. Baxendale was decided.
The broad discretion previously enjoyed by juries in awarding damages
was curtailed substantially when the limitation of foreseeability on dam-
ages recoverable beyond the express terms of the contract was first im-
posed in Hadley.2 6 In Hadley, the plaintiffs operated a grist mill. The
mill was forced to cease operations after a shaft broke in one of its ma-
chines. An employee took the broken shaft to the defendants for ship-
ment to a manufacturing company which was to make a new shaft using
the broken one as a model. The defendants unexcusably delayed ship-
ment for several days. As a result, the mill was shut down for a longer
period of time than was necessary.27 A judgment was entered upon a
jury verdict for the plaintiff which included an award of damages for lost
profits. The verdict was reversed.
Hadley established two rules. First, the injured party may recover
those damages "as may fairly and reasonably be considered . . . [to]
arise naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of things, from such
breach of contract itself.",2 1 Second, the party may recover damages "as
may be reasonably [sic] in the contemplation of both parties, at the time
they made the contract, as to the probable result of it."2 9 The court fur-
ther stated that a delay of several days in the shipment of a shaft does not
"in the usual course of things" result in damaging consequences.3 °
21. White Roofing Co. v. Wheeler, 39 Ala. App. 662, 664, 106 So. 2d 658, 660 (1957).
22. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
23. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 12.14, at 873.
24. Id. at 573-74.
25. Id.
26. Id. § 12.14, at 875.
27. Hadley, 156 Eng. Rep. at 145-46.
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Therefore, liability for damages in excess of contract value will be
awarded only if such damages were in the contemplation of the parties at
the time of contracting (i.e., foreseeable) and were a probable conse-
quence of the breach. Such damages have become known as "special" or
"consequential."3
When parties bind themselves contractually, they usually look forward
to performance, not breach. Theoretically, the subjective contemplation
of the parties is not evidenced by the objective terms and conditions of
the contract. However, courts interpret "contemplation of the parties"
within the framework of the objective theory of contracts. 32 For exam-
ple, the first rule of Hadley anticipates that certain damages will quite
naturally and obviously flow from the breach such that the parties will
have been deemed to have contemplated them. Under the second rule,
nonobvious types of damages are deemed to have been contemplated
only if the promisor knew or had reason to know the special circum-
stances which gave rise to such damages.33
The decision in Hadley evolved as a reaction to perceived excessive
jury awards in breach of contract actions and as an attempt to provide
acceptable rules of contract damages in an emerging industrial society.34
Prior to Hadley, jury awards in contract disputes were often based upon
what is more accurately characterized as tort damages. However, the
Hadley court attempted to restrict damages beyond express terms of the
contract while at the same time acknowledging some need for special or
consequential damages.35 The result of Hadley was to impose a more
severe limitation on the recovery of damages for breach of contract than
that applicable to actions in tort.36 However, arguments have been ad-
vanced that this result actually expanded liability in contract by making
some lost profits and other consequential damages recoverable where, at
least theoretically, none had been before.37 The decision likely represents
a compromise between excessive jury awards or no awards at all for
breach of contract. While the rules of recovery in Hadley were arguably
based on a combination of contract breach and tort negligence, the case
eventually fell victim to the divergence between tort and contract law
that began developing in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.18
Several English cases interpreted Hadley in a restrictive sense and ap-
31. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 12.14, at 875.
32. Id.
33. Hadley, 156 Eng. Rep. at 151; see also E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 12.14, at 874-75.
34. Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the Industrialization of the Law, 4 J. LEGAL
STUD. 249 (1975).
35. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 12.14, at 874-75.
36. Id.
37. G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 51-52 (1974).
38. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 12.14, at 874-75.
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plied a more limited rule of contract damages. Those cases held that
mere notice of special circumstances is an insufficient basis for imposing
liability for consequential damages outside the express terms of the con-
tract.39 Those rulings required that knowledge of special circumstances
"be brought home to the party to be charged under such circumstances
that he accepts the contract with the special condition attached to it."'
In other words, there must be an express or implied condition manifest-
ing the intent to assume the risk of foreseeable consequential damages.
Those damages which are wholly unforeseeable could not be within the
contemplation of the parties and, therefore, are precluded from recovery
on the breach of contract. Moreover, any claim that may arise in tort
from the contract breach is excluded as unforeseeable unless expressly
provided for and the risk is assumed by the party to be charged.
Justice Holmes, speaking for the United States Supreme Court,
adopted this line of reasoning and established the "tacit agreement"
test.4" According to Justice Holmes, "The extent of liability. . . should
be worked out on terms which it fairly may be presumed he [the party to
be charged] would have assented to if they had been presented to his
mind."42 While this approach was generally the common law in the fed-
eral courts, the states did not always follow this lead, seeing the test as
overly restrictive and doctrinally unsound.43 England eventually over-
ruled the "tacit agreement" test." The Uniform Commericial Code ex-
plicitly rejected the test as well.45
The pendulum eventually swung back to center in line with the rules of
Hadley. The modem trend may be toward a strict adherence to the limi-
tations imposed by Hadley by phrasing the test of limitation in terms of
"foreseeability." The Restatement (Second) of Contracts states that
"[d]amages are not recoverable for loss that the party in breach did not
have reason to foresee as a probable result of the breach when the con-
tract was made."46 A loss is foreseeable under the first rule of Hadley if
39. See, e.g., British Columbia Saw-Mill Co. v. Nettleship, 3 L.R.-C.P. 499 (1868); accord
Home v. Midland R.R., 8 L.R.-C.P. 131 (1873); see PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7.
40. Home, 8 L.R.-C.P. at 145-46 (quoting British Columbia Saw-Mill Co., 3 L.R.-C.P. at 509);
see PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7.
41. Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540 (1903).
42. Id. at 543.
43. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 12.14, at 875.
44. Victoria Laundry (Windsor) Ltd. v. Newman Indus. Ltd., [1949] 2 K.B. 528, 537. This
case may also be read to have somewhat liberalized the Hadley v. Baxendale rules in addition to
rejecting the tacit agreement test. Consequential damages were allowed where the defendant had
reason to know the special circumstances although they were not communicated by the plaintiff.
The "reason to know" language is in essence the "foreseeability" test as set out in the RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351(3) (1979).
45. U.C.C. § 2-715 comment 2 (1978) ("The tacit agreement test for recovery of consequential
damages is rejected.").
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 (1979).
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the loss follows in "the ordinary course of events." Under the second
rule, a loss is foreseeable if it follows as a "result of special circumstances,
beyond the ordinary course of events, that the party in breach had reason
to know."' 47 The party in breach need not have consented even tacitly, to
liability for the loss; he need only to have been given notice of facts that
made it foreseeable.48
B. Other Limitations
In traditional contract theory, recovery for pain and suffering and
mental anguish are generally denied. The underlying rationale for denial
is the avoidance of excessive jury awards.49 Such damages also are held
to be uncertain and unascertainable.5" Where such uncertainty exists,
pain and suffering and mental anguish are not foreseeable; therefore, the
parties could not have contemplated them at the time of contracting.
This line of thinking squares with the rules of Hadley, but even more so
with the now-rejected tacit agreement test. 1 The failure of the tacit
agreement test eliminated the court's most convenient vehicle in limiting
special or consequential damages, or denying them altogether. 52 How-
ever, courts remain reluctant to impose liability on a defaulting party
that seems disproportionate to the consideration received.53 The Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts attempts to fill this void: "A court may limit
damages for foreseeable loss by excluding recovery of lost profits, by al-
lowing recovery only for loss incurred in reliance, or otherwise if it con-
cludes that in the circumstances justice so requires in order to avoid
disproportionate compensation. 5s4  The Restatement further provides
that the remedy granted for a breach of a promise made enforceable
through reliance "may be limited as justice requires."55
Courts armed with the ability to limit damage awards arising from
breach of contract have held that in certain circumstances recovery could
be granted for pain and suffering so long as the injury was a foreseeable,
natural and direct result of the breach. 6 In so holding, the courts have
47. Id. § 352 comment 2. The Restatement takes the first of the quoted phrases from U.C.C.
§ 2-714(1), and the second from U.C.C. § 2-715(a).
48. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 12.14, at 876.
49. See, e.g., Winston Cigarette Mach. Co. v. Wells-Whitehead Tobacco Co., 141 N.C. 284,
296, 53 S.E. 885, 889 (1906) ("The breach of a very simple contract... might bring ruin upon the
party in default, by leaving the damages to the unbridled discretion of the jury.").
50. See generally E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, §§ 12.14-.15.
51. See supra note 45, and accompanying text.
52. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 12.17, at 892.
53. Id.
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351(3) (1979).
55. Id. § 90.
56. See, e.g., Sullivan v. O'Conner, 363 Mass. 579, 296 N.E.2d 183 (1979). This textbook case
illustrates the proposition that pain and suffering are recoverable upon a breach of contract. In
Sullivan, a surgeon had agreed to perform plastic surgery on plaintiff's nose to enhance its appear-
7
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indirectly acknowledged the proposition that tort damages may result
from a breach of contract, and those damages may be recoverable.
Recovery of damages for mental anguish or emotional distress arising
from breach of contract generally is denied in traditional contract theory.
The classical position may be stated as follows: Damages for mental
anguish cannot be recovered because they are too remote, uncertain, and
unascertainable, are not within the contemplation of the parties at the
time of contracting, and cannot be said to arise as a material and natural
result of a breach." Even where the limitation of foreseeability may have
been overcome, the denial of damages for mental distress was based on
the argument that recovery is likely to result in disproportionate com-
pensation. Such a result can be justified under the general rules of Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts."8 Whether the actual basis for judicial
reluctance in awarding damages for mental suffering rests on rules of
foreseeability, certainty, reliance, or disproportionate compensation, all
have their roots in the rules first laid down in Hadley.
The courts have not escaped the lingering need for redress in special
cases. Some courts have made exceptions where either a breach resulted
in actual bodily harm," or where the breach was likely to have resulted
in severe mental anguish.' Such cases illustrate the judicial recognition
ance. Instead, the surgery disfigured plaintiff's nose, requiring a third operation which caused her to
endure unnecessary pain and suffering. The court bluntly stated that "an expectancy recovery may
well be excessive" and the facts "suggest moderation as to the breadth of the recovery that should be
permitted." The court further stated that "the fee paid by the patient to the doctor would usually be
quite disproportionate to the putative expectancy recovery" and concluded that the better policy was
to limit recovery to the patient's reliance interest, including her out-of-pocket expenditures, and
allow damages for the worsening of her condition, and for the pain and suffering and mental distress
involved in the third operation." Id. at 585-88, 296 N.E.2d at 187-89 (emphasis added).
57. See, e.g., Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Thrift, 154 Ga. 545, 269 S.E.2d 53 (1980) (recovery of
damages for humiliation and embarassment denied where jury found that the defendant exterminat-
ing company had failed to rid plaintiff's home of termites); Hatfield v. Max Rouse & Sons, 100 Idaho
840, 606 P.2d 944 (1980) (owner of logging equipment denied recovery for emotional distress result-
ing from auctioneer's sale of equipment below minimum specified price because of difficulty in imag-
ining that the parties had contemplated the owner's mental distress upon a breach of sale
agreement); Ostrowe v. Darensbourg, 377 So. 2d 1201 (La. 1979) (owner denied recovery for mental
anguish, suffering and anxiety caused by delay in completion of house alleged to have been specially
designed).
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 (1979).
59. See, e.g., Hawkins v. McGee, 84 N.H. 114, 146 A. 641 (1929) (the infamous "hairy hand"
case).
60. The so-called "casket cases" are illustrative. Hirst v. Elgin Metal Casket Co., 438 F. Supp.
906 (D. Mont. 1977) (casket manufacturer liable for mental suffering when leakproof casket leaked);
Allen v. Jones, 104 Cal. App. 3d 201, 163 Cal. Rptr. 445 (1980) (mortuary liable for mental distress
when cremated remains were lost); Lamm v. Shingleton, 231 N.C. 10, 55 S.E.2d 810 (1949) (under-
taker liable for mental suffering caused by improper burial which caused the casket to break the
surface); cf B & M Homes v. Hogan, 376 So. 2d (Ala. 1979) (plaintiff's severe emotional distress
deemed foreseeable where builder constructed plaintiff's home in a blatantly irresponsible manner);
Wynn v. Monterey Club, 111 Cal. App. 3d 794, 168 Cal. Rptr. 878 (1980) (husband not precluded
from recovering damages for emotional distress due to gambling casino's breach of contract to deny
wife access because she was a compulsive gambler).
8
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that in some instances tort liability may arise from the breach of contrac-
tual obligations and that the remedy must necessarily extend beyond
usual contract limitations.6'
C. Expansion of Damages Recoverable In Tort
The rules of Hadley v. Baxendale effectively precluded any attempt by
lawyers to seek tort damages in breach of contract actions. Economic
losses not foreseeable at the time of the execution of the contract, puni-
tive damages, and damages for mental distress were excluded. However,
simply denying an action based on artificial rules of construction cannot
dispense with the underlying need for redress.
Perhaps more than any other branch of the law, torts is an area more
socially atuned to providing redress for perceived wrongs. Although
many years the least favored child of the common law,62 the growth and
development of torts continually reflects society's evolution.63 The law
of torts provides courts with the ability to gauge the winds of social
change and public policy and set a new course, perhaps at the expense of
overruling established precedent.
At the core of the tort of bad faith breach of contract is the interest in
protecting a plaintiff's emotional well-being. The concept has met con-
siderable resistence-the law of torts included. Seven years after Hadley,
Lord Wenslydale stated in sweeping terms: "Mental pain or anxiety the
law cannot value, and does not pretend to redress, when the unlawful act
complained of causes that alone."'  The venerable Justice Holmes ac-
cepted this general maxim in his treatise on the common law. 65 How-
ever, exceptions have been allowed in certain cases, particularly in the
areas of assault and battery.66 In such cases, the law of torts recognizes
61. California has led the way in recognizing and applying the tort of bad faith breach of con-
tract beyond the "bodily harm" and "casket-type" cases. See, e.g., Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co.,
11 Cal. 3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1974) (insurer's bad faith refusal to settle within
policy limits constituted a tort); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 480 (1973) (insurance company's bad faith refusal to settle was a tort as well as a breach of
contract); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. App. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967)
(damages for mental suffering recoverable where insurer refused to settle claim in good faith); cf
Chung v. Koanohi Center Co., 618 P.2d 283 (Hawaii 1980) (damages for emotional distress and
disappointment are recoverable where actions by shopping mall in denying a lease to a fast food
kitchen amounted to wanton and reckless conduct in flagrant disregard of the promisee's rights).
62. 5 AM. L. REV. 341 (1871) ("we are inclined to think torts is not a proper subject for a law
book"), cited in G. WHrTE, supra note 16, at 1.
63. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, § 3; see also Bohlen, Fifty Years of Tort, 50 HARV. L.
REV. 725 (1937).
64. Lynch v. Knight, 9 H.L. Cas. 577, 598 (1861), cited in Magruder, Mental and Emotional
Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033 (1936).
65. See generally O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1866).
66. I de S et ux v. W de S, Y.B. 22 Edw. III, F.99, pl. 60 (1348), quoted in Dillon v. Legg, 68
Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1967) (en banc). This famous textbook case involved
the tale of the tavern-keeper's wife who, by the narrowest of margins, successfully avoided the
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injury and awards damages that are not capable of exact or even approxi-
mate pecuniary measurement.67 The key to recovery in these kinds of
cases is the requirement of physical impact.6" Aside from recovery for
mental distress arising from the intentional torts of assault and battery,
the courts soon found the issue presented in actions for negligence: the
so-called "fright" cases.69
Recovery for nervous shock and mental suffering caused by a defend-
ant's negligence generally was denied in England and in America at the
turn of the nineteenth century. In Victorian Railways Commissioners v.
Coultas,7" the English court held that a plaintiff is not entitled to recov-
ery of damages for nervous shock caused by the defendant's negligence
without proof that actual physical impact had taken place, proximately
causing the plaintiff's resulting shock and other injuries.7 1 In the same
year, the Supreme Court of New York denied recovery due to shock and
fright caused by defendant's runaway horse.72
In England, the rule against recovery was soon under attack.7 3 Mean-
while, Ireland rejected Coultas and recovery was allowed.74 Scotland
also refused to follow Coultas in an almost identical case.75 In 1915,
hatchet thrown at her by an angry customer. The action was allowed for her fright, and damages
were awarded both as a reparation to the plaintiff and as a deterrent to such breaches of the King's
peace.
67. See, e.g., Beach v. Hancock, 27 N.H. 223 (1853) (fear of personal injury when defendant
aimed gun at plaintiff in an excited manner was reasonable and gave rise to cause of action for
assault); Trogden v. Terry, 172 N.C. 540, 90 S.E. 583 (1916) (plaintiff awarded damages for humilia-
tion and mental suffering).
68. See, e.g., Draper v. Baker, 61 Wis. 450, 21 N.W. 527 (1884) (physical impact requirement
met when defendant spat in the face of plaintiff causing extreme outrage, humiliation and embarass-
ment); Cracker v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 36 Wis. 657 (1875) (physical impact requirement met when
railroad conductor kissed a young school teacher causing her terror and anguish for which the court
allowed compensatory damages for her outraged feelings, insulted virtue, and mental humiliation);
cf Emmke v. DeSilva, 293 F. 17 (8th Cir. 1923) (recovery allowed despite absence of physical im-
pact when hotel manager entered plaintiff's room at night and, in vulgar and insulting language,
accused her of being a common prostitute).
69. For an excellent discussion in this area of the law at the time of its development, see Bohlen,
Right to Recover for Injury Resulting from Negligence Without Impact, 41 AM. L. REG. (n.s.) 141
(1902); Bohlen & Polekoff, Liability in New York for the Physical Consequences ofEmotional Distur-
bance, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 409 (1932); Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20
MICH. L. REV. 497 (1922); and, Throckmorton, Damages for Fright, 34 HARV. L. REV. 260 (1921).
70. 13 App. Cas. 222 (1888). For a discussion of Coultas, see Throckmorton, supra note 69, at
261.
71. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. at 226.
72. Lehman v. Brooklyn City R.R. Co., 54 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 355 (1888) (court could find neither
principle nor authority, nor guidance from counsel to allow an action). For a discussion of Lehman,
see Throckmorton, supra note 69, at 261.
73. See generally Throckmorton, supra note 69, at 261-70.
74. Pugh v. London, Brighton and S. Coast Ry. Co., [1896] 2 Q.B. 248; Delieu v. White &
Sons, [1901] 2 K.B. 669; see Throckmorton, supra note 69, at 261-62.
75. Gilligan v. Robb, 1910 1 Sess. Cas. 856 (plaintiff allowed recovery for illness due to nervous
shock caused by defendant's runaway cow which bolted into her house). For a discussion of Gilli-
gan, see Throckmorton, supra note 69, at 262.
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England allowed recovery for damages due to nervous shock and fright
without physical impact.7 6 However, in America, the road was long for a
plaintiff's recovery of damages for mental suffering or nervous shock
caused by a defendant's negligence yet absent physical impact. Many
jurisdictions steadfastly held to the rule of no recovery, while others
overruled precedent and allowed recovery.77 Still key to recovery in
those jurisdictions that allowed damages for emotional trauma or ner-
vous shock without physical impact was the requirement that there be
some manifestation of physical illness accompanying the mental
distress.78
In the late 1920's and early 1930's, courts saw an increasing number of
cases in which they could not, without obvious pretense, base recovery
for mental distress on traditional concepts of liability, i.e., technical as-
sault or battery. Emerging was a need for legal protection of the plain-
tiff's emotional or mental well-being. In many cases, the defendant's
conduct was so outrageous, exceeding all bounds of decent conduct in
society, that the resulting infliction of mental distress was serious and
deserving of legal protection.79 Courts soon began to recognize inten-
tional infliction of mental distress as a separate tort.8" The jurisdictions,
however, remained split as to whether some evidence of physical symp-
toms had to be shown in order to sustain a claim of intentional infliction
of mental distress.8 t In 1948, a section of the Restatement of Torts was
76. Coyle v. Watson, 1915 A.C. 1, 13-14 (emphasis added):
But in England, in Scotland, and in Ireland alike, the authority of Victorian Railways Commis-
sion v. Coultas has been questioned, and to speak quite frankly, has been denied. I am humbly
of the opinion that the case can no longer be treated as decision guiding authority. . . . I
should add that other cases were cited showing it to be fully established by authority-that
physical impact or lesion is not a necessary element in the case of recovery of damages in ordinary
cases of tort.
For a discussion of Coyle, see Throckmorton, supra note 69, at 263.
77. The requirement of physical impact in many jurisdictions in America was stretched to the
barest minimum-to the point of absurdity-where the actual impact could not possibly have re-
sulted in the injury complained of but served only as a technical basis upon which to award damages
for mental distress. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, § 54, at 363-64.
78. As with the requirement of physical impact, see supra note 77, the requirement of accompa-
nying physical symptons was also stretched to an absurd minimum in awarding damages for mental
distress, i.e., fainting, nausea, stomach pain, inability to eat and sleep, and weight loss. PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 7, § 54, at 363. But see Throckmorton, supra note 69, at 275-81 (supports
continued recognition of an action where the physical injury complained of is shock caused by
fright).
79. The roots of the law of outrage is generally credited to Wilkinson v. Downton, [1897] 2
Q.B. 57, where a practical joker told a woman that her husband lay seriously injured down the street
and that she should go get him at once; consequently, she suffered extreme emotional distress and
physical incapacity for several months. The court deemed the defendant's conduct to be so far
beyond all socially acceptable norms that an award for tort damages should be granted. PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 7, § 12, at 60-65.
80. See, e.g, Stephens v. Waits, 53 Ga. App. 144, 184 S.E. 781 (1936); Gadbury v. Bleitz, 133
Wash. 134, 233 P.2d 299 (1925).
81. See, e.g., Kirby v. Jules Chain Stores Corp., 210 N.C. 808, 188 S.E. 625 (1936) (physical
11
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rewritten to exclude the necessity of showing physical illness or symp-
toms as evidence of mental distress.8 2 Thus, the door was opened to al-
low an independent action for mental distress where plaintiff's emotional
injury was caused by the defendant's outrageous, reckless, or uncon-
scionable conduct. The requirements of actual physical impact and ac-
companying physical symptoms were no longer necessary to maintain
such an action and recover damages for mental distress.8 3 The Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts retained the 1948 supplemental note.8 4
D. "Convergence Of The Twain""5
Whereas Hadley and its progeny in contract law have a history of limi-
tation, tort law has a history of expansion, culminating in the protection
of a plaintiff's emotional well-being through the independent tort of neg-
ligent or intentional infliction of mental injury. The publication of Re-
statement (Second) of Torts section 46,86 and two major California
cases, 87 established that tort liability may stem from contractual obliga-
tions. Emotional injury resulting from a breach of those contractual ob-
ligations, where the breach is willful, wanton or in total disregard of a
promisee's rights, constitutes an independent tort: bad faith breach of
contract.
symptoms not required); but see, e.g., Carrigan v. Henderson, 192 Okla. 254, 135 P.2d 330 (1943)
(physical symptoms required).
82. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46 (Supp. 1948). This amendment was retained and incorpo-
rated into comment k of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1964).
83. See Dillion v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 733-34, 441 P.2d 912, 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. 71, 79 (1968)
(en banc) (citation omitted):
In sum the application of the tort law can never be a matter of mathematical precision. In
terms of characterizing conduct as tortious and matching a money award to the injury suffered
as well as in fixing the extent of the injury, the process cannot be perfect. Undoubtedly, ever
since the ancient case of the tavern-keeper's wife who successfully avoided the hachet cast at her
by an irate customer. . . defendant's have argued that plaintiff's claim of injury from emotional
trauma might be fraudulent. Yet we cannot let the difficulties of adjudication frustrate the
principle that there be a remedy for every substantial wrong.
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1964):
(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe
emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily
harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.
(2) Where such conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is subject to liability if he
intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress
(a) to a member of such person's immediate family who is present at the time, whether or not
such distress results in bodily harm or,
(b) to any person who is present at the time, if such distress results in bodily harm.
85. T. HARDY, THE CONVERGANCE OF THE TWAIN IN ENGLISH LITERATURE: A COLLEGE
ANTHOLOGY 909 (D. Clark ed. 1960). The title of this section is borrowed from Hardy for its
metaphorical value in illustrating that opposing ideas often come together. In their convergance, a
new idea is born and a new era is ushered in, leaving behind historicial fragments of once separate
paths.
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1964).
87. Gruenburg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 556, 510 P.2d 1033, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973);
Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
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III. THEORETICAL BASIS AND ELEMENTS OF THE TORT OF BAD
FAITH BREACH OF CONTRACT
The foundation of the tort of bad faith breach of contract derives from
both tort and contract theory. Under traditional contract theory, the
purpose of an agreement is to secure a bargained-for exchange of goods
or services. A meeting of the minds is required to seal the bargain."8
Under tort theory, the formation of certain contracts gives rise to the
element of emotional or mental well-being, in addition to the objective of
the agreement. This is demonstrated where the nature of the contract
induces emotional security or peace of mind. The insurance contract is
the leading example of a personal contract.8 9 Within our society, tort
law serves to implement standards of acceptable conduct. Because tort
law reflects social policy and provides a remedy where unacceptable con-
duct causes injury, the will or intention of contracting parties may have
significance beyond the terms of the contract.90 Thus, a promisor stands
in a special relationship with the promisee. When a promisor breaches a
contract without reasonable grounds, and negligently, maliciously or fla-
grantly disregards a promisee's rights, his conduct is in bad faith. Such
conduct gives rise to tort liability.
A contract is a promise or set of promises, the breach of which the law
provides a remedy, or the performance of which the law recognizes a
duty.91 The duty to perform an obligation in contract is fundamental.
However, a breach generally imposes no liability beyond express terms of
the agreement, except where such damages were foreseeable and within
the contemplation of the parties when the contract was made. 92 A tort
also may be defined so as to impose a duty, other than contract perform-
ance, that when breached provides a remedy in the form of an action and
damages at law. 93 Tort duty is implied in law and is imposed without the
consent of the parties, unlike the law of contracts which looks to the
voluntary consent of the parties in the agreement, the terms and objec-
tives having been mutually agreed upon. While not every breach of con-
tract is willful,94 the law of contracts provides defenses for breach where
the contract has become impossible to perform or where performance has
88. See Gruenberg, 9 Cal. 3d at 577-78, 510 P.2d at 1040-42, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 487-88 ; Crisci,
66 Cal. 2d at 429, 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16.
89. See Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
90. See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7.
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1979).
92. Recall that the rules of Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854) have been adopted
by the RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
93. See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7.
94. For an excellent discussion and analysis of the element of "wilfullness" in breach of con-
tract, see Marschall, Wilfullness A Crucial Factor in Choosing Remedies for Breach of Contract, 24
ARiz. L. REV. 733 (1982).
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otherwise been excused. 95 In tort, negligence may be defended on the
grounds of last clear chance, contributory negligence, or otherwise where
the limitation of proximate cause has been exceeded. 96 As for the tort of
bad faith breach of contract, the plaintiff generally must establish: (1)
the existence of a contract conforming to traditional contract construc-
tion, thereby creating the duty of performance and the implied-in-law
duty of good faith and fair dealing; (2) the contract objective, which gives
rise to the foreseeable expectation that the promisee has emotional or
mental security in the performance of the contract; and (3) the prom-
isor's breach, which, without reasonable grounds, inflicted mental dis-
tress as a direct, material, and natural result of the breach.97
The recognition and acceptance of the interest in protecting a plain-
tiff's emotional well-being provides the basis for a bad faith breach of
contract cause of action. Allowing recovery in tort where a party suffers
mental injury as a result of another's conduct was necessary in the evolu-
tion of this cause of action. The limitations of physical impact and symp-
toms had to be overcome. 98 In contract, the scope of foreseeability has
expanded; the concept of remoteness is narrowing; and parties to con-
tracts dealing with special relationships or circumstances are increasingly
held to have contemplated a wider range of damages.99 The implied-in-
law contract's covenant of good faith and fair dealing combined with the
interest in protecting a plaintiff's emotional well-being forms the basis for
tortious breach of contract.'O°
A. The Interest in Protecting Plaintiff's Emotional Well-Being
The recognition in tort of both negligent and intentional infliction of
emotional distress' ° ' set the stage for the transition into breach of con-
tract. In Stewart v. Rudner,'t 2 the defendant physician breached an
agreement to perform a Caesarean section to deliver plaintiff's child. The
breach resulted in a stillbirth and caused severe emotional trauma for the
mother. The court admitted that the time "had come to realize, slowly it
is true, that the law protects interests in personality, as well as the physi-
95. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 12.14.
96. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7.
97. See Bolla, Contort: New Protector of Emotional Well-Being in Contract?, 19 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 561, 564 (1983).
98. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
99. Bolla, supra note 97, at 565.
100. Bolla suggests six variations to the theme of tortious breach of contract, all of which may
provide a remedy in tort: (1) damages for a tortious breach of contract with foreseeable emotional
injury; (2) tortious breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing independent of the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress; (3) extreme and outrageous conduct accompanying the
contract breach; (4) actions sounding in tort yet based on contract; (5) intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress; and (6) breach of an implied covenant. Id. at 567-68.
101. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7.
102. 349 Mich. 459, 84 N.W.2d 816 (1957).
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cal integrity of the person, and that emotional damage is just as real (and
just as compensable) as physical damage."'
10 3
Two lines of thought exist for jurisdictions that, like Stewart, allow
relief for mental anguish arising from a breach of contract. Despite
which line is followed, the interest in protecting a plaintiff's emotional
well-being deriving from a breach of contract is still advanced. The first
line of reasoning states that where a contractual duty has as its primary
objective mental or emotional security, or deals in a significant way with
the feelings of the party to whom the duty is owed such that a breach of
the duty would reasonably and directly result in mental anguish, then
recovery of tort damages is allowed."° Courts following this reasoning
generally tend to adhere to traditional contract analysis, distinguishing
between personal and commercial contracts."0 5 The primary objective of
the personal contract must be to give rise to tort damages upon a breach.
If the contract demonstrates such an objective, the inquiry turns to the
conduct of the breaching party. Due to the nature of the personal con-
tract,10 6 courts consider mental injury to occur as a result of the breach
and that the breach was within the contemplation of the parties. When
proven, the court deems the mental injury a direct and natural (i.e., fore-
seeable) result of the breach, and the issue of tort damages may go to the
jury. Where the additional element of aggravation is present, punitive
damages may be awarded.'0 7
The second line of reasoning requires the recognition of a tort in-
dependent from the contract breach before allowing recovery for result-
ing mental anguish.'0 8 Usually, the independent tort is in the form of a
bad faith breach of the implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.'0 9 In so doing, the courts do not stretch the traditional concept
of special or consequential damages in contract to include tort damages
for emotional distress. Where a separate tort is committed, albeit concur-
rent with a contract breach, the parties need not have contemplated the
tort damages. Tort duty is implied in law-without the consent of the
103. Id. at 467, 84 N.W.2d at 822.
104. Bolla, supra note 97, at 566.
105. A personal contract is one that adds mental and emotional security to its primary objective
of economic protection. See, e.g., F. Becker Asphaltum Co. v. Murphy, 224 Ala. 655, 141 So. 630
(1932); Stewart v. Rudner, 349 Mich. 459, 84 N.W.2d 816 (1957); Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C.
181, 254 S.E.2d 611 (1979). See generally Louderback, Standardsfor Limiting the Tort of Bad Faith
Breach of Contract, 16 U.S.F.L. REV. 187 (1982).
106. See supra discussion at p. 39-41.
107. See, e.g., Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181, 254 S.E.2d 611 (1979); Newton v. Standard
Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 229 S.E.2d 297 (1976); Oestreicher v. American Nat'l Stores Inc., 290
N.C. 118, 225 S.E.2d 797 (1976); see also Comment, "Extra-Contractual" Remedies for Breach of
Contract in North Carolina, 55 N.C.L. REV. 1125 (1977).
108. See, e.g., Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480
(1973); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
109. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
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parties-and all proximately caused damages are recoverable. Similarly,
tort damages need not be "foreseeable," the limitation in tort being that
of proximate cause. If the conduct of the party in breach was indeed
tortious, he becomes liable for all injuries proximately caused by the con-
duct. " 0 Punitive damages may be awarded upon a showing of aggravat-
ing factors accompanying the commission of a tort."'
B. The Bad Faith Insurer
In dealing with the tort of bad faith breach of contract, a "tortious"
breach must be distinguished from an innocent breach. An innocent
breach may arise from either a misunderstanding of the scope of the obli-
gation or a valid inability to perform. However, when a promisor in-
duces a promisee to rely on his promise, one he never intended to
perform, the promisor acted fraudulently or misrepresented his promise.
Hence, a tortious breach occurs. A further problem exists where the
promisor's failure or refusal to perform is based upon the promisor's own
interests, rather than upon fraud, honest mistake, or inability. His inten-
tion, nonetheless, was not to fulfill his obligations under the contract.
This is the area of the tort of bad faith breach of contract. 1
2
Many jurisdictions, most notably California," 3 have allowed recovery
based upon bad faith breach of contract in the field of insurance. As
previously stated, the insurance policy is a personal contract creating a
special relationship between the insurer and the insured. The insured has
secured no "real" commercial advantage in the contract because the very
purpose of the agreement is to provide coverage against the economic
loss he would suffer had he not purchased the policy. An inference may
be made that the loss which occurs as a result of an insurer's bad faith
refusal to pay a valid claim is the very loss that was contemplated by the
parties to the contract.
The nature of the insurance contract makes such a contract suitable
for recognizing that a bad faith breach should be actionable in tort. In-
surance contracts are, for the most part, contracts of adhesion. The in-
sured is offered a policy full of fine print and must either take or leave the
policy as is. To the extent he has bargained at all, the policyholder con-
tracts for financial security and the peace of mind and emotional well-
being that a bad faith breach would deny him." 4 Loss of the policy-
holder's peace of mind and mental security is deemed to have been
clearly within the contemplation of the parties at the time the agreement
110. See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7.
111. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
112. See generally Bolla, supra note 97.
113. See, e.g., Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480
(1973); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
114. Crisci, 66 Cal. 2d at 434, 426 P.2d at 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
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was made." 5 One way to avoid the "contemplation of the parties" issue
as raised by Hadley is to recognize that a covenant of good faith and fair
dealing exists between insurer and insured which requires that neither
party impair the contractual rights or benefits of the other. In Gruenberg
v. Aetna Insurance Company," 6 the court explained this duty:
It is the obligation, deemed to be imposed by law, under which the in-
surer must act fairly and in good faith in discharging its contractual re-
sponsibilities. Where in so doing, it fails to deal fairly and in good faith
with its insured by refusing, without proper cause, to compensate its in-
sured for a loss covered by the policy, such conduct may give rise to a
cause of action in tort for breach of an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. 1
1 7
Application of this reasoning to a bad faith breach amounts to an inten-
tional tort, separate and apart from the contract, resulting from a breach
of an implied-in-law duty created by the nature of the contract and the
special relationship of the parties to the contract.
The distinction between bad faith in tort and contract turns on the
nature of the duty breached. An intentional contract breach is a viola-
tion of a promise to complete the contracted-for performance. The duty
to act in good faith and to deal fairly is implied in law and its breach
gives rise to tort damages."' The parties contract voluntarily and ex-
change mutual promises to perform their contractual obligations. The
duty of good faith and fair dealing is implied without the consent of the
parties and in this sense, is involuntary. A contract places the parties in
a special relationship for the performance of certain obligations; the dis-
regard or violation of the duty imposed by law as a result of the contrac-
tually established relationship is a separate intentional wrong-the tort
of bad faith breach of contract.' '9
IV. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN ADOPTION OF THE TORT
OF BAD FAITH BREACH OF CONTRACT
Economic self-interest is a factor inherent in business and commercial
activity.' 2 ° Judicial reluctance to impose tort liability for breach of con-
115. See Stewart v. Rudner, 349 Mich. 459, 465, 84 N.W.2d 816, 824 (1957):
When we have a contract concerned not with trade and commerce but with life and death, not
with profit but with elements of personality, not with pecuniary aggrandizement but with mat-
ters of mental concern and solicitude, then a breach of duty with respect to such contracts will
inevitably and necessarily result in mental anguish, pain and suffering. In such cases the parties
may reasonably be said to have contracted with reference to the payment of damages therefor in
event of breach. Far from being outside the contemplation of the parties, they are an integral
and inseparable part of it.
116. 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
117. Id. at 574, 510 P.2d at 1037, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
118. Hart v. Ludwig, 347 Mich. 559, 79 N.W.2d 895 (1956).
119. Bolla, supra note 97, at 575.
120. C. AMMER & D. AMMER, DICTIONARY OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS 379-80 (1977). See
17
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tract stems from an unofficial acceptance that economic factors motivate
breach. 2' The remedies available under traditional contract theory,
whether involving intentional breach or not, do not substantially deter a
bad faith breach. 1
22
A. Allocation of Risk
If contract breaches are too harshly sanctioned, the result not only
would deter breaches but also would curtail execution of contracts. Such
sanctions are not in keeping with classical economic theory and may not
be a desirable social policy.' 23 If courts routinely allowed legal liability
to exceed the promisee's actual pecuniary losses, efficient reallocation of
resources would be interrupted and the cost ultimately would be paid by
society. The law of contracts evolved within this system of risk
allocation. 
24
Allowing tort recovery for a bad faith breach of contract has been at
odds with the theoretical basis of contract. Defining bad faith as an in-
tentional, willful, selfishly motivated breach of contract is only to ac-
knowledge the covert rationale: the bad faith breach is often anticipated
and encouraged by economic efficiency. The freedom of parties to con-
tract, to agree to buy and sell, or to provide services, is fundamental to
commercial enterprise. An associated policy concern, as stated by one
court, is that:
When two or more persons competent for that purpose upon a sufficient
consideration, voluntarily agree to do or not to do a particular thing
which may be lawfully done or omitted, they should be held to the conse-
quences of their bargain. It is elementary that public policy requires that
such contracts be held sacred and shall be enforced by the courts of jus-
tice unless some other overpowering rule of public policy intervenes
which renders such agreement illegal or unenforceable. This rule im-
poses upon the court a duty to give contracts of that character effect
especially when they have been acted upon by the parties. Without such
a rule the commerce of the world would soon lapse into a chaotic
state. 25
generally A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, UNIVERSITY ECONOMIcS: ELEMENTS OF INQUIRY 24-25 (3d
ed. 1972).
121. Diamond, The Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract. When, if at all, Should it Extend
Beyond Insurance Transactions?, 64 MARQ. L. REV. 425, 429 (1981).
122. Id. at 435.
123. It is in society's interest that each individual reallocate his resources whenever it makes
him better off without making some other unit worse off. Since reallocation through breach will
not make the injured party worse off if his expectations are protected by preserving his planned
allocation of resources, and will, by hypothesis, make the party in breach better off, it is in
society's interest that the contract be broken and the resources be reallocated.
Id. at 437 (citing E. FARNSWORTH & W. YOUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 20
(1980)).
124. See generally E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5.
125. Bliss v. Southern Pac. Co., 212 Or. 634, 646, 321 P.2d 324, 330 (1958).
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Judicial reluctance in accepting the tort of bad faith breach of contract is
valid where purely commercial contracts are involved. Still, exceptions
to the general rule have been allowed where the nature of the contract
relates to matters other than strictly pecuniary interest.
2 6
B. Distinguishing Personal and Commercial Contracts
The majority of jurisdictions that either recognize the tort of bad faith
or allow damages based on some other tort (i.e., fraud, misrepresenta-
tion, or infliction of emotional distress) distinguish between personal and
commercial contracts, allowing damages in tort for the former but limit-
ing damages in contract for the latter."2 7 The policy concerns associated
with personal contracts are viewed somewhat differently than those with
commercial contracts. The personal contract usually creates a special
relationship between the promisor and the promisee. This relationship
may be characterized along the lines of "quasi-fiduciary."' 28
Public policy considerations become paramount once the nature of an
insurance contract is examined. The insured contracts for certain protec-
tion against loss for which the insurer agrees to indemnify. Should the
insurer in bad faith refuse to pay a valid claim, the insured is left with
added expenses and mental anxiety. The insured seeks no commercial
advantage in purchasing insurance and in most cases is compelled to do
so by law (e.g. automobile insurance). He is usually subject to less-than-
equal bargaining power; insurance contracts are in essence contracts of
adhesion. Furthermore, the insurance industry is regulated and, a legiti-
mate policy concern exists for protecting the public from unfair prac-
tices.' 29 Therefore, policy considerations that rely on the fear of
interference with commercial activity are misplaced when personal con-
tracts are involved. The inverse, however, rings true. Public policy dic-
tates that bad faith breach of personal contracts should be enforced
through the awarding of tort damages, not only to compensate the in-
jured party but to serve as a general deterrent against bad faith breach. '130
126. Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181, 254 S.E.2d 611 (1979) (separation agreement held to
be a personal contract involving more than mere pecuniary gain).
127. See generally Louderback, supra note 105.
128. Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 598 P.2d 52, 157 Cal. Rptr. 482 (1979)
(A personal contract carries with it certain obligations by the promisor that he will abide by the
contract to insure that the promisee's expected benefits are protected; thus, the promisor stands
almost in a fiduciaries' shoes when dealing with the promisee.).
129. See generally Best, Statutes and Regulations Controlling Life and Health Insurance Claim
Practices, 29 DEF. L.J. 115 (1982). For an in-depth analysis of whether the tort of bad faith breach
of contract should extend beyond insurance or personal contracts, see Louderback, supra note 105,
and Diamond, supra note 121.
130. See Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., II Cal. 3d 452, 462, 521 P.2d 1103, 1109, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 711, 717 (1974) ("Defendant's failure to afford relief to its insured against the very eventuality
insured against ... amounts to a violation as a matter of law of its duty of good faith and fair
dealing implied in every policy.").
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C. Litigation in the Courts
The fear of spurious litigation has historically affected the development
of tort doctrine, and has occasionally been a determinative factor in re-
fusing to expand tort liability though such expansion may have been war-
ranted.131 The same fears were espoused when consequential damages
were permitted in contract and when strict liability and infliction of emo-
tional distress were recognized in torts.'3 2 So too, have similar fears sur-
rounded the recognition of the tort of bad faith breach of contract.
33
Assuming sanctions imposed for bad faith breach are sufficient to in-
duce an injured promisee to sue, the sanctions, at least theoretically,
should be sufficient to induce a promisor not to act in bad faith and
breach a contract.134 Those who would breach a contract at the prom-
isee's expense are discouraged from engaging in the tortious conduct lest
the penalty of tort liability be levied upon them. Where a tortious breach
does occur, the promisee should be allowed to seek a tort remedy for the
promisor's tortious conduct. To the extent that tort principles deter
wrongful conduct,135 the need for litigation traditionally decreases after
the initial surge of complaints.
1 36
V. SHOULD THIS INFANT TORT BE ALLOWED To GROW
IN NORTH CAROLINA?
As of this writing, the question titling this section has yet to be defini-
tively answered in North Carolina. However, a discernable trend sug-
gests the answer will be in the affirmative. The recognition and
acceptance of the tort of bad faith breach of contract has been a primary
issue in four North Carolina cases. 137 Prior to the first of these cases,
Oestreicher v. American National Stores, Inc. ,13 North Carolina held fast
to the traditional maxim: "Punitive (tort) damages are not awarded for
breach of contract."1 39 However, courts have ruled that certain behav-
ior, once surpassing the bounds of decent conduct, is tortious and should
be deterred. In such cases, some courts have gone to great lengths to
131. See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, §§ 1-12.
132. See generally E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7.
133. Diamond, supra note 121, at 429.
134. Id. at 449-50.
135. The foremost examples are the products and strict liability cases. Products liability spurred
industry to insure the safety of their products before presenting them to the public for sale. Strict
liability stands for the proprosition that all persons engaging in ultra-hazardous activities would be
held strictly liable for resulting damages. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7.
136. Diamond, supra note 121, at 449.
137. Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181, 254 S.E.2d 611 (1979); Newton v. Standard Fire Ins.
Co, 291 N.C. 105, 229 S.E.2d 297 (1976); Oestreicher v. American Nat'l Stores, Inc., 290 N.C. 118,
225 S.E2d 797 (1976); Dailey v. Integon Gen. Ins. Corp., 75 N.C. App. 387, 331 S.E.2d 148 (1985).
138. 290 N.C. 118, 225 S.E.2d 797 (1976).
139. See, e.g., King v. Insurance Co., 273 N.C. 396, 398, 159 S.E.2d 891, 893 (1968).
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separate and identify an independent tort so as to be actionable outside
the contract." Also pre-dating Oestreicher, North Carolina adhered to
the idea that "aggravating factors" must accompany the tortious con-
duct. Alternatively, the conduct, though tortious in nature, would be
deemed dependent upon and limited to the contract action, thereby sub-
jecting the claim to the traditional elements of foreseeability, contempla-
tion of the parties, remoteness, and certainty.
14'
A. Oestreicher v. American National Stores, Inc. 142
Oestreicher involved a commercial lease agreement between two busi-
ness enterprises. The defendant leased a building from the plaintiff for
the purpose of operating a retail furniture business. The lease provided
that the defendant was to pay minimal rent plus five percent of its net
sales income above a stated amount. 4 a Thirteen years later, plaintiff
sued, alleging that defendant fraudulently misrepresented its net sales for
nine years, depriving the plaintiff of $11,233.20 due under the lease.'"
Plaintiff claimed that the fraudulent reporting of sales breached the lease
agreement. Plaintiff further requested an award of punitive damages
based on fraud and misrepresentation. 4 '
The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant on the
issue of punitive damgages. 146 The North Carolina Court of Appeals dis-
missed plaintiff's appeal as improperly interlocutory,' 47 and after grant-
ing discretionary review, the supreme court held that the breach of
contract and punitive damages claims were improperly severed. 14" The
court would not allow the tort (punitive damages) action to be severed
from the breach of contract action because the plaintiff has a substantial
right to have both causes heard before the same judge and jury. The
court ordered the issue of punitive damages returned to the jury for de-
termination, stating that while this was a "type of contract case," the
case nonetheless contained "substantial tort overtones emanating from
140. See, e.g., Binder v. GMAC, 222 N.C. 512, 23 S.E.2d 894 (1943); Woody v. First Nat'l
Bank, 194 N.C. 549, 140 S.E. 150 (1927); Carmichael v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 157 N.C. 21,
72 S.E. 619 (1911). Notable among the exceptions are the breach of contract to marry, carrier cases,
and the casket cases. See cases cited supra note 60.
141. Comment, supra note 107, at 1134.
142. 290 N.C. 118, 225 S.E.2d 797 (1976).
143. Id. at 120, 225 S.E.2d at 799.
144. Id. at 132-33, 225 S.E.2d at 806-07.
145. Id. at 132, 225 S.E.2d at 806-07.
146. Id. at 121, 225 S.E.2d at 800.
147. Oestriecher v. American Nat'l Stores, Inc., 27 N.C. App. 330, 330, 219 S.E.2d 303, 304
(1975).
148. Oestriecher, 290 N.C. at 130, 225 S.E.2d at 805 ("The causes of action that the plaintiff
alleges are related to each other. He seeks punitive damages in the second cause because of the
alleged misconduct of defendant in the first cause of action.").
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the fraud and deceit." 1 49
The Oestreicher court struggled with precedent that denied recovery
for tort damages as a result of a breach of contract. A large hurdle was
presented by Swinton v. Savoy Realty Company, 5° a 1953 case that in-
volved fraud. In Swinton, the court reversed a jury award for punitive
damages based on the theory that "there must be an element of aggrava-
tion accompanying the tortious conduct which causes the injury,"'5 1
concluding that "[f]raud is not an accompanying element of an independ-
ent tort but the particular tort alleged."' 52 Therefore, Swinton stands for
the proposition that upon a breach of contract, in order to take the issue
of punitive damages to the jury, an independent tort with attendant ag-
gravating circumstances must be present.
53
The court in Oestreicher characterized the issue to be decided as one
dealing with "damages for fraud arising from a contract agreement."'
' 5 4
Another issue was whether defendant's tortious conduct demonstrated
sufficient bad intent to award punitive damages to the plaintiff, or
whether additional aggravating factors were needed. 15  First, the court
read Swinton to mean that in breach of contract actions where tort dam-
ages are alleged, the issue may reach the jury upon a showing of an in-
dependent tort actionable outside the contract.1 56 Second, finding that
the fraud perpetrated by the defendant upon the plaintiff was an in-
dependent tort, the court decided that the fraud itself was sufficient ag-
gravation to warrant punitive damages and that additional aggravating
factors were unnecessary.
1 57
The majority in Oestreicher did not clearly state whether a distinct,
independent tort must be found in a breach of contract action before the
issue of tort damages could go to the jury. When the court says punitive
damages may be recovered where "breach of contract actions. . . smack
of tort" and have "substantial tort overtones," 158 uncertainty is created
149. Id.
150. 236 N.C. 723, 73 S.E.2d 785 (1953). Swinton involved a fraudulent sale of land. The plain-
tiffs were uneducated blacks who had paid $2000 for land that the seller had said was a larger tract
than it actually was. After paying for the land, the plaintiffs received a deed that was one-tenth the
size that it was represented to be by the seller at the time they contracted to purchase. The plaintiffs
sought contract damages and punitive damages for the fraud. The court denied the claim for puni-
tive damages. Id. at 724-25, 73 S.E.2d at 785-88.
151. Id. at 725, 73 S.E.2d at 786.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 726, 73 S.E.2d at 786. Note that the "aggravating factors" test generally has been
applied to all tort cases where punitive damages were sought. Application of this test seems a logical
extension to breach of contract actions where tort damages are sought. See Comment, supra note
107, at 1134.
154. Oestriecher, 290 N.C. at 133, 225 S.E.2d at 807.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 135, 225 S.E.2d at 808.
157. Id. at 136, 225 S.E.2d at 808.
158. Id.
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as to exactly what standard is to be applied." 9 Nonetheless, the decision
opened the door to allow victims of contract breach arising from a de-
fendant's tortious conduct (fraud) to reach the jury with a claim for puni-
tive damages.
B. Newton v. Standard Fire Insurance Company'60
Decided the same year as Oestreicher, Newton differed substantially on
its facts. Plaintiff, owner-operater of a retail business, purchased an in-
surance policy from the defendant which provided theft coverage. Plain-
tiff filed a claim for losses under the policy when his store was
burglarized. Defendant refused to pay the claim. 161 The plaintiff sought
compensatory and punitive damages alleging that defendant's conduct
was "heedless, wanton and oppressive" in refusing to "properly settle"
the claim. 
162
Once again, the trial court disallowed the claim for punitive damages
on the stated ground that North Carolina law did not permit punitive
damages in breach of contract actions. 163 On appeal, the supreme court
stated that a party claiming punitive damages in a breach of contract
action did have a substantive right to be heard on both issues by the same
trial court and jury."
The majority in Newton upheld the rule that punitive damages may be
awarded where an independent tort exists separate and apart from the
breach of contract claim.' 65 The court specifically overruled Swinton,
distinguishing simple from aggravated fraud, and permitted punitive
damages for the latter but not the former. 166 The plaintiff argued that
the defendant's conduct amounted to a separate tort for which punitive
damages should be awarded. The Newton court responded by affirming
the dismissal of punitive damages, stating that the circumstances in the
case fell short of proving the required tort. However, the court indicated
that punitive damages would have been proper had either of three cir-
159. Chief Justice Sharp dissented in Oestreicher, implying that the majority was taking a radical
departure from traditional contract theory and was in effect creating a new rule distinguishable from
Swinton which the majority purportedly followed. The chief justice insisted that plaintiff's only
rights were those for which plaintiff contracted, and any recovery beyond those terms unjustly en-
riched the plaintiff. Moreover, Chief Justice Sharp argued that if the plaintiff had an action in tort
for fraud, the fraud was not proven sufficiently to cause separation from the breach of contract
action. Oestreicher, 290 N.C. at 146, 225 S.E.2d at 814 (Sharp, C.J., dissenting in part and concur-
ring in part).
160. 291 N.C. 105, 229 S.E.2d 297 (1976).
161. Id. at 109, 229 S.E.2d at 300.
162. Id. at 110, 229 S.E.2d at 300. Plaintiff sought $5500 in compensatory damages and $50,000
in punitive damages. Id.
163. Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 27 N.C. App. 168, 218 S.E.2d 232 (1975).
164. Newton, 291 N.C. at 168, 218 S.E.2d at 232.
165. Id. at 111, 229 S.E.2d at 301.
166. Id. at 113-14, 229 S.E.2d at 302.
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cumstances been proven: (1) fraud; (2) that the insurer had refused to
investigate the claim; or, (3) that after investigating the insurer found the
claim to be valid but still refused to settle with the intention of causing
further harm to the plaintiff.
1 67
Newton is important for its conceptual analysis of the tort of bad faith
by Justice Exum in dictum. t68 Phrased differently, the question before
the court may have been whether the alleged oppressive conduct of the
defendant insurer amounted to bad faith and, thus, an independent tort
sufficient to warrant tort damages. Recognizing that California pio-
neered the concept of bad faith breach as a tort, 16 9 Justice Exum looked
to several California cases for a definition of the tort. 17  The court subse-
quently concluded:
Because of the great disparity of financial resources which generally ex-
ists between insurer and insured and the fact that insurance companies,
like common carriers and utilities, are regulated and clearly affected with
a public interest, we recognize the wisdom of a rule which would deter
refusals on the part of insurers to pay valid claims when the refusals are
both unjustified and in bad faith.'
Although Newton may indicate that the court was carefully treading its
way into recognizing the tort of bad faith breach of contract, this the
court would not do:
Insurer's knowledge that plaintiff was in a precarious financial position in
view of his loss does not in itself show bad faith on the part of the insurer
in refusing to pay the claim, or for that matter, that the refusal was un-
justified. . . Had plaintiff claimed that after due investigation by de-
fendant that the claim was valid and defendant nevertheless refused to
pay or that defendant refused to make any investigation at all, and that
defendant's refusals were in bad faith with an intent to cause further
damages to plaintiff, a different question would be presented.1
72
Without explicitly approving the California definition of "bad faith,"
the Newton court nevertheless used the term without providing a defini-
tion of its own, leaving future courts uncertain as to whether the tort of
bad faith should be recognized in North Carolina. Moreover, courts are
still without guidelines as to the actionable elements of the tort. The
court sent plaintiff Newton away with only his contract rights intact. He
167. Id. at 115-16, 229 S.E.2d at 303. Justice Exum went to great lengths in the Newton opinion
to outline the policy in North Carolina in awarding punitive damages. This discussion may have
been in response to Chief Justice Sharp's dissenting opinion in Oestreicher. Id. at 113, 229 S.E.2d at
302. See Comment, supra note 107, at 1142.
168. 291 N.C. at 114-15, 229 S.E.2d at 303.
169. Id.
170. Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1974);
Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973); Crisci v.
Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
171. Newton, 291 N.C. at 116, 229 S.E.2d at 303.
172. Id. at 115-16, 229 S.E.2d at 303.
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had failed to show the necessary aggravation vis-a-vis fraud to give rise to
punitive damages, and the court refused to recognize any other action in
tort.I7 3 Clinging to a dichotomy between contract and tort, and unable
to reconcile its differences, the court in Newton held that claims for relief
must fall within one or the other, and denied the introduction of bad
faith breach of contract in North Carolina.
C. Stanback v. Stanback174
In Stanback, the plaintiff-wife sued defendant-husband for alleged
breach of a separation agreement seeking recovery of actual, compensa-
tory, and punitive damages. The trial court dismissed all claims except
that of actual damages. The North Carolina Court of Appeals af-
firmed.' 7 5 On discretionary review, 176 the North Carolina Supreme
Court held that the complaint failed to state a claim for consequential
damages but sufficiently stated a claim for punitive damages for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress.
177
The court in Stanback began its analysis by stating the problem in
contract terms: "[The] limitation on the recovery of damages for breach
of contract was first enunciated in the famous English case of Hadley v.
Baxendale."'' 78  The court outlined the general theory of recovery in
traditional contract construction.' 79 The court noted that when recovery
is sought for mental anguish as a result of the breach, the general rule is
that of denial based on policy concerns of limiting contractual risk with
or without the formal application of the Hadley test. 80 However, the
court pointed out a line of cases that excepted to the general rule' 8 ' and
more recent attempts to formulate a standard test for allowing recovery
for mental anguish in a wider range of cases.' 82 The court quoted a
173. Id. at 114, 229 S.E.2d at 302 ("This case involves no tort.").
174. 297 N.C. 181, 254 S.E.2d 611 (1979).
175. Stanback v. Stanback, 37 N.C. App. 324, 246 S.E.2d 74 (1978).
176. Stanback v. Stanback, 295 N.C. 649, 248 S.E.2d 253 (1978).
177. Stanback, 297 N.C. at 194, 198-99, 254 S.E.2d at 620, 622-23.
178. Id. at 187, 254 S.E.2d at 616 (citing Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854)).
179. According to the court, damages are recoverable upon breach if they are foreseeable, and
are such that they will follow in the ordinary course of events and were within the contemplation of
the parties at the time of contracting. Whether special or consequential damages are recoverable
upon breach depends "upon the information communicated to or [within] the knowledge of the
breaching party at the time of contracting." Id.
180. Id. at 188, 254 S.E.2d at 617.
181. Id. at 188-89, 254 S.E.2d at 617-20. Among the exceptions noted by the court are the now
familiar breach of a promise to marry, the carrier and telegraph cases, and the "casket cases." See
cases cited supra note 60.
182. Id. at 189-201, 254 S.E.2d at 618-20. The court apparently accepted the proposition that
some contracts have as their objective, personal rather than pecuniary purposes. Thus any breach
may necessarily include mental anguish as damages. An insurance contract is the foremost example
of a personal contract. Recovery for mental anguish could extend to any contract where a special
25
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North Carolina case, Lamm v. Shingleton,183 :
The tenderest feelings of the human heart center around the remains of
the dead. When the defendants contracted with the plaintiff to enter the
body of the deceased husband in a workmanlike manner they did so with
the knowledge that she was the widow and would naturally and probably
suffer mental anguish if they failed to fulfill their contractual obligations
in the manner to be charged. The contract was predominantly personal
in nature and no substantial pecuniary loss would follow its breach ...
It cannot be said, therefore, that such damages were not within the con-
templation of the parties at the time the contract was made.1
84
The court cited other jurisdictions'85 and distinguished between personal
and commercial contracts.
186
With two provisos, the court concluded that a plaintiff could recover
consequential damages for mental anguish arising from a breach of con-
tract. The first proviso required that the contract be personal in nature.
Second, the court required that the benefits contracted for (1) not have
pecuniary interest as their primary objective, (2) relate directly to matters
of dignity, mental concern, or the sensibilities of the party to whom the
duty is owed, and (3) directly involve interests and emotions recognized
by all as involving great probability of resulting mental anguish if not
respected.1 87 Although the court in Stanback established that conse-
quential damages for mental anguish resulting from a breach of contract
could be awarded, the court held that in this case, the plaintiff had failed
to prove the elements set out above and affirmed the appeals court.
18 8
The second issue confronted by the court in Stanback was whether the
plaintiff had stated a sufficient claim for relief so as to ask the jury for an
relationship exists between promisor-promisee giving rise to mental or emotional well-being and
security in its performance. See Bolla, supra note 97, at 565-67.
183. 231 N.C. 10, 55 S.E.2d 810 (1949) (breach of a burial contract where the plaintiff's hus-
band's casket rose to the surface several months after interment, causing severe shock and mental
anguish to the plaintiff. An inspection revealed that the vault either had been improperly secured or
not locked at all to begin with. The court said the action was for breach of contract to bury hus-
band's body properly and not an action in tort.)
184. 297 N.C. at 191, 254 S.E.2d at 619 (quoting Lamm v. Shingleton, 231 N.C. 10, 15, 55
S.E.2d 810, 813-14 (1949)).
185. F. Becker Asphaltum Co. v. Murphy, 224 Ala. 655, 657, 141 So. 630, 631 (1932) ("[W]here
the contractual duty or obligation is so coupled with matters of mental concern or solicitude, or with
the feelings of the party to whom the duty is owed, that a breach of that duty will necessarily or
reasonably result in mental anguish or suffering, it is just that damages therefore be taken into con-
sideration and awarded."); Stewart v. Rudner, 349 Mich. 459, 84 N.W.2d 816 (1957) (physician's
failure to carry out agreement to perform Caesarian section delivery resulted in a stillbirth of the
child, causing mother severe emotional trauma).
186. Stanback, 297 N.C. at 192, 254 S.E.2d at 619.
187. Id. at 194, 254 S.E.2d at 621.
188. There is an ongoing debate as to whether breach of contract resulting in emotional distress
in contract is really distinguishable from negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress in
tort. In each case, the determination and award of damages are left to the discretion of the jury.
While emotional harm may result from a contract breach, the actual conduct that causes the breach
stems from tort duty. See generally Bolla, supra note 97.
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award of punitive damages. 89 Relying on Newton and Oestreicher, the
court concluded that when a "breach of contract also constitutes or is
accompanied by an identifiable tortious act, the tort committed may be
grounds for recovery of punitive damages."' ' However, identifying the
tort is not enough: "Even where sufficient facts are alleged to make out
an identifiable tort. . the tortious conduct must be accompanied by or
partake of some element of aggravation before punitive damages will be
allowed."' 9' Unlike Newton, the Stanback court held that the trial court
erred in dismissing plaintiff's allegations which were "sufficient to state a
claim for what has become essentially the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress."' 92 The court reasoned that plaintiff's allegation of
great mental anguish and anxiety as a result of defendant's willful, mali-
cious, and calculated conduct was a sufficient allegation of "other emo-
tional disturbance" to state a claim for relief.'93 In addition, by alleging
that defendant "acted with full knowledge of the consequences of his
actions she has sufficiently indicated that the harm she suffered was a
foreseeable result of his conduct."' 94 Furthermore, the plaintiff met the
requirement that some element of aggravation accompany the tortious
conduct in order to seek punitive damages.
Stanback must be appreciated for recognizing that a tort action exists
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Moreover, basing this
upon a breach of contract was a significant step toward allowing recovery
for punitive damages without a further showing of aggravated circum-
stances. However, the court did not address the issue of bad faith breach
and whether tortious conduct causing a breach, may in and of itself, be
compensable without regard to actual contract damages or punitive
damages. 95
189. Stanback, 297 N.C. at 196, 254 S.E.2d at 621.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 198, 254 S.E.2d at 621-22.
193. Id. at 197-98, 254 S.E.2d at 622-23 (citing Kirby v. Jules Chain Store Corp., 210 N.C. 808,
188 S.E.2d 625) (1936) (damages for fright are recoverable when some physical injury contempora-
neously, naturally, and proximately results from the fright caused by the defendant's negligent and
wilful misconduct)).
194. Stanback, 297 N.C. at 198, 254 S.E.2d at 623 (citing Slaughter v. Slaughter, 264 N.C. 732,
142 S.E.2d 683 (1955)). The Stanback court additionally stated that "plaintiff must show some
physical injury resulting from the emotional disturbance caused by defendant's alleged conduct," but
noted that "given the broad interpretation of 'physical injury' in our case law, we think her allega-
tion that she suffered great mental anguish and anxiety is sufficient to go to trial" Id. The courts
tenacious reliance on the pretense of physical impact or attendant physical symptoms before al-
lowing damages for mental distress illustrates the preferred judicial reluctance in matters of this
nature.
195. Tort damages may include all proximately caused injury, including economic loss, attor-
neys fees, and mental anquish above and beyond actual contract and punitive damages. More im-
portantly, the element of aggravation need not be shown since the commission of the tort is
aggravation enough. However, in North Carolina, the exact status of this position is unclear. The
element of aggravation may still have to be shown for an independent tort. For an award of punitive
27
Pope: Bad Faith Breach of Contract: Should This Infant Tort Be Allowed
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1986
BAD FAITH BREACH
D. Dailey v. Integon General Insurance Corp. 196
In Dailey, the plaintiff sued defendant-insurer for failing to settle or
pay plaintiff's claim under a policy insuring plaintiff's house and personal
property against loss by fire.19 7 The complaint sought relief from the
insurer (1) for breach of contract in failing to pay the losses covered
under the policy, (2) for bad faith failure to settle the policy obliga-
tions, 198 and (3) for bad faith refusal to settle the insurance claim.' 99
Plaintiff further alleged that defendant's conduct was willful, wanton,
malicious and intentional, the purpose being to pressure plaintiff into ac-
cepting an unfair settlement and, therefore, was a breach of its implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.2
The defendant moved to dismiss all claims at trial. The trial court
dismissed plaintiff's second and third claims but allowed the first claim to
stand.2°1 On appeal, the court reversed the trial court's order of dismis-
sal on the second and third claims holding them justiciable claims for
relief.21 2 At the close of plaintiff's evidence at trial, the trial court di-
rected a verdict against plaintiff's second claim but allowed the first and
third claims to go to the jury. On the first claim, the jury awarded plain-
tiff $105,000 for fire damage done to the house, $37,000 for fire damage
done to the house's contents, and $15,000 for living expenses during the
thirty months that the premises had remained uninhabitable.20 3 On the
third claim, the jury awarded punitive damages in the amount of $20,000
based on the malicious conduct of defendant's agent and $100,000 for
defendant's wrongful failure to settle the claim in good faith. 21 On de-
fendant's motion, the trial court entered a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict on both awards for punitive damages. The trial court noted that
plaintiff's allegations were supported by the evidence, but stated that
North Carolina law simply did not permit punitive damages in a case
based on a breach of contract and to allow the issues to go to the jury was
error.215 Plaintiff appealed.
Dailey presented two main issues on appeal: (1) whether punitive
damages are recoverable in North Carolina where the basic, underlying
damages, aggravating factors need to be shown. See Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C.
105, 229 S.E.2d 297 (1976).
196. 75 N.C. App. 387, 331 S.E.2d 148, disc. rev. denied, 314 N.C. 664, 336 S.E.2d 399 (1985).
197. Id. at 389, 331 S.E.2d at 150.
198. On this claim plaintiff sought compensatory damages for expenses incurred and time lost in
pursuing the claim. Id.
199. On this claim plaintiff sought punitive damages. Id.
200. Id. at 390-93, 331 S.E.2d at 151-53.
201. Id at 389, 331 S.E.2d at 151.
202. Dailey v. Integon Gen. Ins. Corp., 57 N.C. App. 346,.350, 291 S.E.2d 331, 333 (1982).
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claim is for breach of contract; and (2) whether compensatory damages
for mental anguish resulting from a bad faith breach of a contract states a
claim sufficient to present to the jury.2 ° 6 The Dailey court immediately
acknowledged the general rule denying recovery for punitive damages
based on a breach of contract but also recognized the more recent cases
which allowed recovery.2 °7 The court of appeals noted that because
Newton was decided by the supreme court, the trial court had relied on
the exception to the general rule in holding that in some cases a breach of
contract action had also stated a claim for which punitive damages could
be awarded. On each issue, the court of appeals held that the trial court
had erroneously dismissed plaintiff's claim for punitive damages.208
Therefore, the court concluded that North Carolina law now permits the
recovery of punitive damages on claims for tortious, bad faith refusals to
settle under insurance policies, though the refusal to settle also consti-
tutes a breach of contract.2 °9 The court stated: "In this case, according
to the evidence, the identifiable tort alleged - defendant's bad faith re-
fusal to settle - not only accompanied the breach of contract, it was also
a breach of the contract that was accomplished by some element of ag-
gravation. ' 20 The jury's finding of accompanying aggravation was suffi-
cient to find that the defendant tortiously refused in bad faith to settle
plaintiff's claim. The record revealed that the defendant acted mali-
ciously, oppressively, wilfully and with reckless indifference to conse-
quences. 21  The court of appeals reinstated the jury verdict awarding
punitive damages for bad faith refusal to settle a valid claim.212
On the second issue, the court concluded that an allegation of mental
suffering resulting from a bad faith breach of contract states a claim for
relief sufficient to go to the jury. The court relied on Stanback2 3 to sup-
port its conclusion.21 4 Because Stanback also recognized the tort of in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress where a claim of this nature
206. Id. at 394, 400, 331 S.E.2d at 153, 157.
207. Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 111, 229 S.E.2d 297, 301 (1976) ("Never-
theless, when there is an identifiable tort even though the tort constitutes, or accompanies, a breach
of contract, the tort itself may give rise to a claim for punitive damages."); Oestreicher v. American
Nat'l Stores, Inc., 290 N.C. 118, 136, 225 S.E.2d 797, 809 (1976) (Punitive damages may be appro-
priate in breach of contract actions that "smack of tort because of the fraud and deceit involved" or
those actions "with substantial tort overtones emanating from the fraud and deceit.").
208. Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181, 196, 254 S.E.2d 611, 621 (1979); Payne v. North
Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 67 N.C. App. 692, 696, 313 S.E.2d 912, 915 (1984); Dailey v.
Integon Gen. Ins. Corp., 57 N.C. App. 346, 350, 291 S.E.2d 331, 333 (1982).
209. Dailey, 75 N.C. App. at 394-99, 331 S.E.2d at 153-56.
210. Id. at 396, 331 S.E.2d at 154.
211. Id. at 396, 331 S.E.2d at 155.
212. Id. at 397-98, 331 S.E.2d at 155-56.
213. 297 N.C. 181, 198, 254 S.E.2d 611, 622-23 (1979) (defendant's "willful, malicious, calcu-
lated, deliberate and purposeful" conduct in breaching a separation agreement stated a claim for
relief).
214. Dailey, 75 N.C. App. at 400-01, 331 S.E.2d at 157.
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arises from a breach of contract, a sufficient allegation may go to the jury
for a determination.
In Dailey, the court of appeals held that a claim based on a bad faith
breach of contract that results in the intentional infliction of emotional
distress may be presented to the jury. However, the court affirmed the
dismissal of the claim stating that absent from the record was any testi-
mony whatsoever to indicate that plaintiff suffered emotional distress,
compensable or otherwise, because of defendant's bad faith refusal to set-
tle the claim. Such injury may not be assumed and must be proven by
evidence.215 The court did not discuss how the mental injury may be
proved or whether compensatory damages may be awarded absent the
element of aggravation. Reading Oestreicher, Newton, and Stanback
leads to an inference requiring that the element of aggravation be pres-
ent. Yet, a more aggravating factor than the tort itself is unimaginable.
And if proven, why should compensatory damages not be awarded based
on the tort alone, independent of actual contract or punitive damages?
Such would be the case upon recognition and acceptance of the in-
dependent tort duty of good faith and fair dealing - the tort of bad faith
breach of contract.216
VI. CONCLUSION
A strong judicial reluctance to recognize the tort of bad faith breach of
contract permeates the courtroom. Perhaps such a reluctance is due to
the inability of the courts to resolve doctrinal uncertainties that exist be-
tween tort and contract. These difficulties may be overcome by realizing
two points. First, every contract contains an implied-in-law covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. Second, breach of the implied covenant pro-
vides an injured party with an actionable tort of bad faith, regardless of
whether the acts complained of also constitute a breach of contract. Like
other intentional torts, bad faith can be proven by circumstantial as well
as direct evidence. Once proven, recoverable damages would include
mental distress and economic loss. In addition, punitive damages have
provided a stumbling block to recovery in tort for bad faith. Neverthe-
less, the tort should be actionable without regard to either actual con-
tract or punitive damages. However, where sufficiently outrageous
conduct accompanies the bad faith breach, punitive damages also should
be awarded.
215. Id. at 401, 331 S.E.2d at 158.
216. The tort duty of good faith and fair dealing was suggested in Newton v. Standard Fire Ins.
Co., 291 N.C. 105, 229 S.E.2d 297 (1976) to arise in instances of insurance, or where there is a
personal contract, see supra p. 45. However, this was dictum, and the issue was left open as to
whether the tort of bad faith breach of contract would be recognized in North Carolina as an in-
dependent tort.
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North Carolina's appellate courts have opened the door to recovery for
breaches of personal contracts that are accompanied by identifiable tor-
tious conduct. However, the courts have pulled up short of recognizing
the full-blown tort of bad faith breach of contract-a tort actionable on
its own grounds. Because the last word in North Carolina on this sub-
ject, Dailey v. Integon General Insurance Corp. ,217 stands without a defi-
nition of the tort of bad faith breach of contract, and is equally deceptive
as to whether such a tort, once defined, is actionable without regard to a
claim of punitive damages, the tort remains in limbo in this state.
Concurrent with the rapid development of tort law, which has been
predisposed to deriving rules dealing with mental and emotional suffer-
ing, many courts are coming full circle to acknowledge that tort liability
may result from a breach of contract. North Carolina should likewise
square its position on the tort of bad faith breach of contract and join the
growing circle. If further injury, especially in the insurance industry, is
to be avoided, tort and contract in North Carolina should best arrive at
their point of departure which began universally with Hadley v.
Baxendale.218
DARRELL POPE
217. 75 N.C. App. 387, 331 S.E.2d 148, disc. rev. denied, 314 N.C. 664, 336 S.E.2d 399 (1985).
218. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
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